

Day 2 - New Employee Onboarding



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Captain Todd E. Hutchison

Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Larry Tarasek

Technical Director, NSWCCD

Welcome Back



Welcome Back!

Sign-in / Review Agenda



Agenda Day 2 Onboarding



0845-0955 - Welcome Back / Agenda /Sign-in

0900 - Purchase Card / Unauthorized Commitments (UACs)

<u>0920 - Workforce Development / Professional Development Training Request Process</u>

1010 - Break 1

1020 - Military Protocol

1050 - Command Evaluation & Review Brief

1130 <u>- Lunch</u>

1200 - Initial Security Orientation and Indoctrination Brief

1230 - Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) & Privacy & Personally Identifiable Info. (PII) - Mandatory Trng.

1250 - Operations Security Training (OPSEC) & Physical Security Mandatory Trng.

1300 <u>- Break 2</u>

1310 - Insider Threat Training

1330 - Antiterrorism Level I / Active Shooter - Mandatory Trng.

1400 - Wrap-Up / Questions / Complete Survey



Purchase Card & Unauthorized Commitments (UACs)



Purchase Card



Unauthorized Commitments (UACs)



Code 0212, October 2020

What is an UAC?



- An agreement made by a government representative who lacks the authority to obligate or commit appropriated funds on behalf of the Government, thus making the agreement non-binding (Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR] 1.602-3).
- Any person lacking the proper authority who deliberately or unintentionally authorizes a supplier to provide goods or services to the Government creates an unauthorized commitment. The responsible individual may be held personally and financially liable for said commitment.
- A request for ratification must "establish whether the unauthorized commitment meets the ratification requirements set forth in." [FAR 1.602-3]

Summarizing the previous slide......



A UAC is an agreement that is not binding solely because the government representative who made it lacked the authority to enter into that agreement on behalf of the government

Personnel OTHER than Contracting Officers and Purchase Card Holders lack authority to bind the government!

A ratification request must establish whether the UCA meets the requirements for ratification as set forth in FAR 1.602-3.

Examples of UACs



A training class was scheduled and held BUT the cardholder had not paid for the class prior to personnel attending the first day of the class.

An unauthorized government employee requested locksmith services from a contractor knowing a contract was NOT in place and promised future payment.

A subject matter expert or Contracting Officer's representative (COR) directed a contractor to perform out-of-scope work on a contract.

Examples of UACs (cont.)



A subject matter expert or Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) directed a contractor to perform additional tasking after the contractor had expended all the funding provided on the contract.

Personnel sent equipment to be inspected to the vendor before the vendor received authorization to perform the inspection via a contract or purchase card buy. The equipment was sent with a shipping form clearly stating a \$500 inspection fee. The contractor performed the inspection upon receipt of the equipment.

Scenarios



Scenario 1:

- Question: A Federal employee with purchase card authority of up to \$3,500 enters into a contract with a hotel for a meeting space that costs \$4,300.
- Answer: This is an UAC! => <u>Reason:</u> Total cost of the meeting space exceeds the cardholder's authority.

Scenarios (cont.)



Scenario 2:

- Q: The program office has a contract for 20 working printers. One of the printers jams frequently and a new printer has been delivered as a replacement. The contractor is told to leave the old printer in place, because it still works.
- A: This is an UAC! => <u>Reason:</u> Contractor provided more than he/she is under contract to provide. Since the contract only permits 20 printers, the old printer should be removed when the replacement was delivered. The person interacting with the contractor should contact the Contracting Officer or COR and allow them to provide instructions to the contractor.

Scenarios (cont.)



Scenario 3:

- •Q: A supplier mistakes a request for information for an order and subsequently ships an item.
- •A: This is NOT an UAC as long as: The person that received the item does NOT accept (or use) the delivered item. The person who receives the item should notify the Contracting Officer or COR and the vendor that mistakenly shipped the item.
- •BEWARE: If a vendor emails a software update/license or subscription renewal to an employee BEFORE the vendor receives the contract, and the user downloads the update or renewal, this IS a UAC because the user downloaded the update, indicating it was accepted before it was authorized by a Contracting Officer/Purchase Card Holder.

UAC Statistics at Carderock



- •FY 20: 0 actions ratified

 2 actions resolved into a non-reportable status,
 with one paid by the unauthorized individual
- •FY 19: 3 ratified actions
- •FY 18: 1 ratified action
- •FY 17:
- 4 actions ratified
- 5 actions resolved into a non-reportable status => 3 actions being paid by the unauthorized individual

Impacts of UACs



UACs must be ratified by a Contracting Officer, thus taking priority over other work that needs to be performed.

All UACs are reported to NAVSEA, and if NAVSEA has received more than seven (7), NAVSEA is required to report the UAC to ASN.

All UAC's over \$50,000 and for repeat offenders must be approved at SEA00.

If NOT ratified, you are personally responsible to pay.

Even if ratified, you still may be subjected to disciplinary action. Severe damage to government-contractor relationship

POC for UACs



If you need more information or have questions regarding unauthorized commitments, please contact our Policy Branch at Code02_Policy.fct@navy.mil.

Questions?





Workforce Development

"Developing Today's Workforce to Face Tomorrow's Challenges"



Goal



- Provide high quality, timely and relevant employee development programs that enhance individual knowledge, skills and abilities.
- Develop employees that have the skills that allows the division to meet our customers needs.
- Provide programs that develop a well-rounded employee.




TOTAL WORKFORCE MANAGEMENT SERVICES (TWMS)



- TWMS is the location to complete all non-safety related mandatory training.
- Training is announced via All Hands email and once the training is completed, TWMS automatically records completion.
- To access TMWS, employee must have a Common Access Card (CAC)
- https://twms.nmci.navy.mil/login.asp





On-Site Training



Open to all employees Wide range of topics

- Technical/Professional Development
- Employee Development
- Leadership, Supervisory



Online Course Catalog, All Hands Emails

Navy Enterprise Resource Program (ERP)

- Employee, Admin Officer or Training Coordinator enters
- Must be approved by Supervisor
- Paid by Department (generally)
- Approved by Workforce Development
- Navy ERP Link: https://ep.erp.navy.mil/irj/portal



Training Rules



Must be entered into Navy ERP NLT three weeks prior to class start date

- Enter as soon as possible
- Let us know of any special requirements or payments

Do **NOT** attend training until fully approved

Workforce Development is final approval

No-show – Department still pays Provide proof of training completion

Purchase Card holders for Training/Conferences: Cecelia Paulding

Olamidayo Odusanya

Renard Walker





ERP ATR simulations



New ATR simulations:

- Employee Submits: https://enpx.erp.navy.mil/EnableNow24/pub/navsea2/index.html?library=library.txt&show=project!PR_F45FB7B15B1A598B
- Supervisor Approval: https://enpx.erp.navy.mil/EnableNow24/pub/navsea2/index.html?library=library.txt&show=project!PR_931EDBA90012DA8F
- Financial Manager Approval:
 https://enpx.erp.navy.mil/EnableNow24/pub/navsea2/index.html?library=library.txt&show=project!PR 747319126C2D7D95
- Training Manager Approval: https://enpx.erp.navy.mil/EnableNow24/pub/navsea2/index.html?library=library.txt&show=project!PR_6C394D0C57FF50A8
- Displaying an ATR:
 https://enpx.erp.navy.mil/EnableNow24/pub/navsea2/index.html?library=library.txt&show=project!PR_136D35A2D4B6F383



Off-Site Training



Specific Technical or Professional Training required for position

Individual researches vendors & coordinates with Workforce Development staff

Entered and approved through Navy ERP





More Information



- CARDEROCKDIVINST 12410.13C Civilian Training, Education, and Career Development
- Carderock Intranet New Hire Bridge
- Call or email the Workforce Development Branch
 - West Bethesda
 - Jorge Galindo, Branch Head
 - Linda Florian
 - Olamidayo Odusanya (Diana)
 - Cecelia Paulding (CeCe)
 - Renard Walker



Break 1



Break - 1





NAVY AND MILITARY PROTOCOL





Topics to be Covered



- Department of Navy (DoN) Civilians
- Military Personnel
- Addressing Military Personnel
- Navy Terminology
- Some Basic Navy Customs
- Riding a Ship



Life as a DoN Civilian





Working as a DoN civilian places you in a different culture from a standard position in private industry.

Generally, you will work with and for civilians, but there are some differences between our work environment and private industry you should know...

- Our command chief executive is a Navy Captain
- You will likely have many opportunities to work directly with Navy, Marine, and other military officers and enlisted personnel
- Many of our processes are based on military instructions, regulations or practices
- Military names and acronyms pervade our work vocabulary
- When working on ships, there is an expectation that civilians know some basic things about ship life, terms and customs
- The military traditions and ceremonies are very powerful and motivating - civilians are expected to be familiar with them



Three Categories of Military Personnel





- Officers Are commissioned by the President and are highly educated, specially trained military leaders who manage the Navy's personnel, ships, aircraft, and weapons systems.
- Warrant Officers Specialists in their fields who are selected for positions between the ranks of officer and enlisted personnel (US Air Force does not have these)
- Enlisted Those who enlist in the service as nonofficers and who perform the numerous specialized tasks that accomplish the mission

Officers



Officers are generalists trained to make decisions and lead organizations of various levels of responsibility and complexity.

In the Navy

- O-1 through O-4 are junior grade officers
- O-5 and O-6 are senior officers
- O-7 through O-10 are flag officers

In the Marines

- O-1 through O-3 are company grade officers
- O-4 through O-6 are field grade officers
- O-7 through O-10 are general officers

In the civilian leadership structure of the United States military, the Marine Corps is a <u>component of</u> the United States Department of the Navy (DoN).

In the military leadership structure, the Marine Corps is a separate branch.



Navy and Marine Corps Officer Titles



In the Navy

- O-1 Ensign (ENS)
- O-2 Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG)
- O-3 Lieutenant (LT)
- O-4 Lieutenant Commander (LCDR)
- O-5 Commander (CDR)
- O-6 Captain (CAPT)
- O-7 Rear Admiral Lower Half (RDML) 1 star
- O-8 Rear Admiral Upper Half (RADM) 2 star
- O-9 Vice Admiral (VADM) 3 star
- O-10 Admiral (ADM) 4 star
- None Fleet Admiral (Wartime Only)

In the Marine Corps

- O-1 2ND Lieutenant (2nd Lt.)
- O-2 First Lieutenant (1st Lt.)
- O-3 Captain (Capt.)
- O-4 Major (Maj.)
- O-5 Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.)
- O-6 Colonel (Col.)
- O-7 Brigadier General ((Brig. Gen.)
- O-8 Major General (Maj. Gen.)
- O-9 Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.)
- O-10 General (Gen.)

For a complete chart comparing officer ranks of all service branches, visit the

<u>US DoD Military Officer Rank Insignia Website</u>



How to Interact with Senior Officers



As you may interact with senior officers, generally O-6s and higher, below are some protocols to observe:



- At most military installations, stand for Flag Officers and Commanding Officers (CO) when they enter a room or are announced
- Generally, they are an O-6 or higher (Navy Captain or other Service Branch Colonel)
- Sometimes they are announced before entering the room: "Officer on Deck!"
- A salute is not necessary; civilians do not salute
- Officers and CO's avoid fraternization with enlisted sailors and soldiers – civilians may generally follow suit when in the presence of officers
- Use sir or ma'am when appropriate
- Use proper military speak when discussing common terms such as dates, time or ship terminology
- Adhere to strict standards of timeliness and appearance when you are expecting to meet with a senior officer



Navy Enlisted Titles



In the Navy

- E1 Seaman Recruit
- E2 Seaman Apprentice
- E3 Seaman
- E4 Petty Officer 3rd Class
- E5 Petty Officer 2nd Class
- E6 Petty Officer 1st Class
- E7 Chief Petty Officer
- E8 Senior Chief Petty Officer
- E9 Master Chief Petty Officer or
- E9 Fleet or Command Master Chief Petty Officer
- E9 Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy



Can be addressed as Petty Officer or by their rate. E.g., OS1 for an Operational Specialist First Class Petty Officer.

Can be addressed as Chief, Senior Chief or Master Chief or by their rate. E.g., ETCS for an Electronics Technician Senior Chief.

Rate – The pay grade a person works in

Rating – The specialized field the person trains in or works in

Enlisted Navy personnel do not have a rank, only naval officers do

For a complete chart comparing enlisted rates and ranks of all service branches, visit the <u>US DoD Militan</u>

<u>Enlisted Rank Insignia Website</u>

USMC Enlisted Titles



In the Marine Corps

- E1 Private
- E2 Private First Class
- E3 Lance Corporal
- E4 Corporal
- E5 Sergeant
- E6 Staff Sergeant
- E7 Gunnery Sergeant
- E8 Master Sergeant or First Sergeant
- E9 Sergeant Major
- E9 Master Gunnery Sergeant
- E9 Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps



Rate – The pay grade a person works in

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) – The specialized field the person trains in or works in (very similar to Navy Rating)

For a complete chart comparing enlisted rates and ranks of all service branches, visit the <u>US DoD Military</u>

<u>-nlisted Rank Insignia Website</u>

Non-Commissioned Officers



Navy Petty Officers and USMC Corporals and Sergeants are considered non-commissioned officers (NCOs) (E4 and higher)

Junior NCOs (E4s) function as first tier supervisors and technical leaders

NCOs serving in the top three enlisted grades (E-7, E-8, and E-9) are termed senior NCOs

- Chief Petty Officers in the Navy (and Coast Guard)
- Expected to exercise leadership at a more general level
- Lead larger groups of service members
- Mentor junior officers, and advise senior officers on matters pertaining to their areas of responsibility
- Marine Corps senior NCOs are referred to as Staff NCOs
- A select few senior NCOs serve at the highest levels of their service, advising their service
 Secretary and Chief of Staff on all matters pertaining to the well-being and utilization of the enlisted force



Navy Terminology



You may hear or be exposed to various Naval terms, particularly if you work with actual ships or people from shipyards. Here are some terms you will want to be familiar with. Many were derived from hundreds of years of naval operations across the globe.

Hull – The outside part of the ship that rides in or above the water line but below the main deck

Bow or Fore – Forward most part of the hull

Aft or Fantail – Back most part of the hull

Keel – The foundation of the ship, it is the very bottom most part of the hull and it usually forms a V or U shape

Stem – The forward most end of the keel

Stern – The after most end of the keel to which the rudder is usually attached

Bulkheads – The walls in the interior of the ship that divide it into compartments

Decks – Floors of the ship

Portholes – Windows of the ship



Navy Terminology



You may hear or be exposed to various Naval terms, particularly if you work with actual ships or people from shipyards. Here are some terms you will want to be familiar with. Many were derived from hundreds of years of naval operations across the globe.

Gangway – Walkway between the shore and the ship used for crew and passengers to board or leave

Go Aloft – Climb up ladders to go to higher decks in the ship


Go Below - Climb down ladders to get to lower decks.

Passageway – Essentially a walkway or hallway leading to other compartments.

Quarterdeck – Not actually a deck, but a designated compartment where official business and operations of the ship are carried out.

Starboard Side – Right hand side of the ship (looking towards the bow)

Port Side – Left hand side of the ship



USS Constitution in dry-dock during restoration/maintenance



Navy Terminology



Applying ship terminology to buildings is very common. Dam Neck site employees checked in at the Quarterdeck this morning. These terms are also used frequently at the Pentagon or the Washington Navy Yard (WNY).

Quarterdeck – Receptionist desk and area

Decks – Floors in a building

Head – Bathroom

Passageways or P-ways – Hallways

Bulkheads – Walls



Washington Navy Yard



Riding a Ship



You may be assigned at some time to visit a ship to see the technology or system your are working on firsthand. Always remember the Ship is the Sailor's home, and you are an onboard guest. It is therefore important to observe and respect the Navy's customs and courtesies, and to always conduct yourself in a professional manner.

All NSWCCD employees planning to ride a ship will undergo shipboard training to learn the etiquette, safety, and procedures aboard ship.



Manning the Rails - A form of salute or honor; in this case, celebrating return to port



Phonetic Alphabet



Aboard ships, signals are sent to one another as letters and/or numbers, which have meanings by themselves or in certain combinations. In the Allied Signals Book, "BZ" or "Bravo Zulu" means "Well Done"

Phonetic Alphabet

Alpha November Bravo Oscar Charlie Papa Delta Quebec Echo Romeo **Foxtrot** Sierra Golf **Tango** Uniform Hotel India Victor Juliet Whiskey Kilo X-Ray Lima Yankee Mike Zulu



Change of Command Ceremony



- The formal passing of responsibility, authority, and accountability of command from one officer to another
- Rich in naval tradition and quite formal
- The relieving orders are read and the outgoing Commanding Officer has the opportunity to say goodbye. The new Commanding Officer reads the order of assignment to command and officially "reports for duty"
- Generally happens about every 3 years at NSWC Carderock.



Daily Honoring of the Colors



- Colors are honored every day at 0800 and sunset
- If you observe that this ceremony is about to begin, follow these guidelines:
 - If driving, pull over and wait for the ceremony to conclude
 - If walking, stop, face the direction of the flag or music, and cover your heart with your right hand until the ceremony is concluded



Ceremonial Honoring of the Colors at Events



- A Color Guard will move forward with the Flags to present to all people present
- All present rise and face the Color Guard
- The National Anthem is played
- At this time, all military members salute while the music plays
- All civilians remove their hats and place their right hand over their hearts



The Flag may be referred to as: "The Flag",
"The Colors", "The Standard" or
"The National Ensign"



Recognition by the CO or Executive



Navy employees can receive recognition from the CO or an Executive from NSWCCD or another military activity for a job well-done



- A formal letter of recognition may be sent
- A formal awarding of honor or recognition in the correct venue may take place, e.g.:
 - A department technical award
 - A NSWCCD award at the annual awards ceremony



In Closing...



These are just some of the interesting facets of Navy and Military protocol.

For more information on Navy Protocol, you can research several Navy and commercial websites.

Here are a few suggestions:

Official Site of the United States Navy – www.navy.mil

Official website of the Department of Defense – www.defense.gov

Naval History and Heritage Command – www.history.navy.mil

NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER CARDEROCK DIVISION



Command Review & Investigations Office (Code 00N)









Staffing:

- John R. Wilson, CR&I Director/Investigator
- Jacob Hobbs, Investigator
- Duc Cang, Auditor
- Vacant, Auditor



NSWCCD Instruction 5000.1D

- Command Review & Investigations Program
- CR&I is meant to provide the Commanding Officer (CO) with an independent, in-house assessment capability designed to assist in improving mission accomplishment, integrity of command and economical use of resources. command or activity operations. The CR&I Office is a staff function that reports directly to the CO.



Programmatic Functions:

1. Hotline Program (Fraud, Waste, Abuse & Mismanagement)

- Serves as the focal point for FWA matters, including overall program coordination.
- Conducts investigations and inquiries of internal/ external hotline allegations.
- If appropriate, refers fraudulent cases to Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

2. Command Directed Investigations (CDIs)

 Conducts Management Inquiries, Preliminary Inquiries, JAGMAN investigations and other Command-level Investigations as directed by the Commanding Officer.





3. Command Evaluations/Reviews (Annual Plan)

- Conducts periodic and special reviews, evaluations, studies and analyses of command or activity operations.
- Provides an independent, in-house capability to detect deficiencies, improprieties or inefficiencies.
- Provides recommendations to correct conditions which adversely impact mission accomplishment, command integrity, or efficient use of resources.

4. Audit Liaison/Follow-up

- Serves as Division liaison, and provides logistical and administrative support for the GAO, NAVAUDSVC, DOD IG, and NAVINSGEN.
- Maintains a central depository of audit reports and audit responses to findings and recommendations.





Matters Appropriate for the Inspector General's Hotline

- * Abuse of Title/Position
- * Bribes/Kickbacks/Acceptance of Gratuities
- * Conflicts of Interests
- * Ethics Violations
- * False Official Statements/Claims
- * Fraud
- * Gifts (Improper receipt or giving)
- * Waste (Gross)
- * Misuse of Official Time, Gov't Property,
 Position and Public Office

- * Political Activities
- * Purchase Card Abuse
- * Reprisal (Military Whistleblower Protection)
- * Safety/Public Health (Substantial/Specific)
- * Systemic Problems
- * Time and Attendance (Significant Violations)
- * Travel Card Abuse/Travel Fraud
- * Mismanagement/Organ. Oversight (Significant Cases)







QUESTIONS?

REMEMBER THE HOTLINE NUMBER: (301) 227-4228

Visit our Intranet Site:

https://cuthill.aw3s.navy.mil/intra/ig/

How to File a Complaint:

https://cuthill.aw3s.navy.mil/intra/ig/how_to_file.html

NAVSEA Hotline Number: 1-800-356-8464

NAVSEA Hotline Email: NSSC_NAVSEAIGHotline@navy.mil



lunch



Lunch

Return at 1200





Adam Wallmark, Code 1053 Special Programs

Captain Todd E. Hutchison

Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Larry Tarasek

Technical Director, NSWCCD

Security Education & Awareness



'Activities undertaken to ensure that people have the skills, knowledge, and information to enable quality performance of security functions and responsibilities, understand security program policies and requirements, and maintain continued awareness of security requirements and intelligence threats.'

Security Mission



The protection of U.S. Government assets including people, property, and both classified and controlled unclassified information is the responsibility of each and every member of the Department of Navy (DON), regardless of how it was obtained or what form it takes. Our vigilance is imperative. Anyone with access to these resources has an obligation to protect them.



Objectives




 Identify each functional areas and responsibilities of security

Provide a basic understanding of DOD security policies

Security Division (Code 105)





Code 105 Office Hours



Main Hours

• 0730-1530

Classified Mail Handling/Document Control

- 0730 1100
- 1200 1500
- FedEx Drop Offs
 - NLT Noon, prior day
 - Last day/time for pick up Thursday/0900



Personnel Security



Security Clearances



- Employment with the NSWCCD requires you to maintain eligibility for access to classified information
- Completed Electronic Questionnaires for Investigation Processing (e-QIP) system
- Access to classified information will be authorized at the level necessary to perform your duties

Eligibility for Access to Classified Material is a privilege, not a right.





Your Security Clearance




- Position sensitivity and/or duties will determine level of clearance or access
- There are three levels of Security Access Requirements (SAR):
 - Top Secret (TS)
 - Secret (S)
 - Confidential (C)
- You MUST coordinate with your Security Manager for all matters concerning security clearance/access!



Security Clearance Process





13 Adjudicative Guidelines



- A Allegiance to the U. S.
- B Foreign Influence
- C Foreign Preference
- D Sexual Behavior
- E Personal Conduct
- F Financial Considerations
- G Alcohol Consumption
- H Drug Involvement & Substance Abuse
- I Psychological Conditions
- J Criminal Conduct
- K Handling Protected Information
- L Outside Activities
- M Use of Information Technology

ALLEGIANCE ISSUES

CHARACTER ISSUES



HEALTH ISSUES

BEHAVIOR ISSUES

Access Eligibility Process



Eligibility Determination

Administrative action, usually involving a form of background investigation and adjudication determination for trustworthiness



SF 312

Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement:
All persons authorized access to classified information are required to sign a SF 312, a legal contractual agreement between you and the U.S. Government.



Need-to-Know

Determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to perform a lawful and authorized government function.



The ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified information.



Continuous Evaluation Program



Employees must recognize and avoid behaviors that might jeopardize their security clearance.

In accordance with NSWCCD Policy Statement for Continuous Evaluation Program, dated 22 FEB 17: individuals are required to report to their supervisor or appropriate security personnel and seek assistance for <u>any incident or situation that could affect their continued eligibility for access to classified information</u>. Individuals shall be initially and periodically briefed thereafter, to ensure familiarity with pertinent security regulations and the standards of conduct required of individuals holding positions of trust.

The ultimate responsibility for maintaining eligibility to access classified information rests on YOU!



Self-Reporting



Self-reporting is mandatory and emphasizes personal integrity

With this privilege comes the obligation to report certain activities

Foreign Travel



Foreign Contacts



Marriage/Divorce



Alcohol Abuse



Drug Use





Bankruptcy/ Credit Issues




Incarceration/
Arrest



Foreign Allegiance



Loss/Compromise of Classified Info



*Foreign Influence

*Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence (FOCI) concerns



Classified Info Non-Disclosure



SF-312, Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement

- Full Name
- SSN
- Signature
- Witness
- Debriefing
- Lifetime

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FRONT BACK

NOTE: Contractors Only - fill out organization information





Information Security



Information Security



The protection of classified and controlled unclassified information (CUI), including but not limited to:

- Marking
- Handling
- Transmission
- Storage
- Destruction



Information Categories



Classified Information

- TOP SECRET (TS) (Exceptionally Grave Damage)
- SECRET (S) (Serious Damage)
- CONFIDENTIAL (C) (Damage)



Controlled Unclassified Information

- For Official Use Only (FOUO) [FOIA exemptions 2-9]
- Distribution Controlled
- Personal Identifiable Information (PII)
- Privacy Act Information
- Proprietary Information (ownership belongs to Contractor)



Safeguarding Classified Information



Cover Sheets

SF 703 - Top Secret (orange)

SF 704 - Secret (red)

SF 705 - Confidential (blue)



Labels

SF-706 - Top Secret (orange)

SF-707 - Secret (red)

SF-708 - Confidential (blue)

SF-709 - Classified (purple)

SF-710 - Unclassified (green)



Types of Classified Materials



Classified Material can include ANY of these and must be properly marked:



How Information Is Classified?



Original Classification

- Initial classification decision
- Original Classification Authority (OCA)
 - Designated in writing by SECNAV (for Top Secret) and DUSN (Policy) (for Secret)
 - NOTE: Commanding Officer, NSWC Carderock Division IS NOT an OCA

Derivative Classification

- Incorporating, paraphrasing, restating, or generating, in new form, information that is already classified
- Training is mandatory (every two years)
- Derivative sources:
 - Security Classification Guide (SCG)
 - Properly marked source documents (e.g., books, pamphlets, etc.)
 - DD Form 254, DoD Contract Security Classification Specification



Classified Information Source Lines



ORIGINAL CLASSIFIER

Classified By: John Smith, Director

Reason: 1.4(c)

Declassify On: 20551231

DERIVATIVE CLASSIFIER

Classified By: Sue Jones, Code 453

Derived From: PMO Ships SCG

Declassify On: 20551231



Handling Classified Information



Must be:

- Under positive control by an authorized person and/or stored in an approved GSA container, vault, or secure room
- Discussed only in authorized areas and/or processed via authorized systems/equipment (e.g., STE, SIPRNet, JWICS)
- Protect/safeguard with appropriate cover sheet
- Properly marked
- Must have a courier card when hand carrying
- Secured/protected when found unattended

Storing Classified Information



Do not take classified

materials home!

Classified Information Must Be:

In a GSA Approved Container/Secure Room/Vault when not being used

DO NOT:

- Leave classified material unattended
- Leave classified material in desk drawers
- Leave classified material in open security containers

*****DO NOT** TAKE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL HOME***




Destruction of Classified Information



- Must be destroyed in device approved for classified material destruction*
- Approved shredders are located throughout the Command
- Shredders will contain a certification memo
- Other classified media Contact Security (227-1408)
- All NNPI must be destroyed via approved methods*
- All purchases of classified information destruction devices must be coordinated through Security (Code 105)

*Destruction device must be listed on a current NSA Evaluated Products List (EPL)






Destruction of Classified Information



- Burning
- Shredding*
- Pulverizing*
- Disintegrating*
- Degaussing*
- Pulping
- Melting
- Chemical Decomposition
- Mutilation



NSA EPL

- -- Storage Device Sanitation
- -- Magnetic Media Degaussers
- Hard Drive Destruction Devices
- -- High Security Disintegrators
- -- Optical Media Destruction Devices
- -- Crosscut Paper Shredders
- -- Punched Tape Destruction Devices
- -- Solid State Destruction Devices





Incident Categories Defined



Willful --- Negligent --- Inadvertent

- An incident is willful if the person purposefully disregards DoD security or information safeguarding policies or requirements (e.g., intentionally bypassing a known security control).
- An incident is negligent if the person acted unreasonably in causing the spillage or unauthorized disclosure (e.g., a careless lack of attention to detail, or reckless disregard for proper procedures).
- An incident is inadvertent if the person did not know, and had no reasonable basis to know, that the security violation or unauthorized disclosure was occurring (e.g., the person reasonably relied on improper markings).

Per DEPSECDEF memo of 14 Aug 2014, Subject: Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information or Controlled Unclassified Information ODD Information Systems



Types of Security Incidents



- Violations Any knowing, willful or negligent action that could reasonably be expected to result in an unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Examples include:
 - Open/unattended security containers
 - Discussing classified information in an unsecure setting
 - Processing classified information on unclassified systems
 (Note: The presence of classified information on the NMCI NIPRNET is always considered a Security Violation).
 [Electronic Spillage]
- <u>Infractions</u> Any knowing, willful or negligent action contrary to the requirements of an order or its implementing directives that do not constitute a 'violation', as defined above. Examples include:
 - Failure to use a cover sheet
 - Not using a security container checklist
 - Not using open/closed sign on a security container





Physical Security



Protection and Prevention



The two primary purposes of physical security are **PREVENTION** and **PROTECTION**. Properly designed and executed physical security programs should deter or prevent to the greatest degree possible the loss, theft, or damage to an asset.

Protection of:

- Resources
- Facilities
- Classified Information
- Operations

Prevention from:

- Theft
- Unauthorized Access
- Loss
- Compromise

Physical Security



Physical security functions offer security-in-depth, and include, but are not limited to:

- Perimeter fences
- Employee and visitor access controls
- Badges/Common Access Cards (CAC)
- Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
- Random guard patrols
- Prohibited item controls
- Entry/Exit inspections
- Visitor escorts
- CCTV monitoring





Storing Classified Information



- Custodian responsibilities
- Container maintenance
- Combo changes
- SF-700, Security Container Info
- SF-701, End of Day Checklist
- SF-702, Security Container Checklist

GSA







SF 700 Security Container Information NAV



- Initiate a combination change when an employee no longer requires access, if there is a compromise, and/or when a container is placed in/out of service.
- Fill out page one and place in an opaque envelope
 - Lists after-hours custodian contact information (PII)
 - Place sealed envelop in control drawer of security container
 - Page two lists combo, place in sealed envelope and provide to Security Office

SECURITY CONTAINER INFORMATION	AREA OR POST	if required) 42	3. ROOM NO.
Complete Part 1 and Part 2A (on end of liap). Detach Part 1 and attach to the enable of the control drawer of the security container.	Code 105	S. CONTAINER NO.	
Mark Parts 2 and 2A with the highest classification involvation of this security container. Delacti Part SA, insurt in envelope (Part 2) and seat. See Provincy Act Statement on inverse.	B. MFG. & CLASS OF	7 MFG. 8 LOCK MODEL X -0 7	B. SERIAL NO. OF LOCK
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Matthew Stubblefield	Complete	Complete Phone number	
Timothy Willingham	complete	Address Address	complete phone number
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Security Containers and Secure Rooms



- SF 702-Security Container Check Sheet
 - Posted on outside of container or door
 - Every day must be accounted for including weekends and holidays
 - Completed form retained for 90 days from last entry




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End-of-Day Security Checks



- SF 701-Activity Security Checklist
 - Posted on inside of room, closest to exit
 - Annotate weekends and holidays
 - Completed form retained for 90 days from last day





Access



- Base Access:
 - Common Access Card (CAC)
 - Authorized pass
 - Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS)
 - Credentialing for contractors, vendors, and suppliers requiring recurring access
 - Not required for contractors with CAC
 - All contractors (w/o a CAC), vendors and delivery personnel are required to complete and sign the SECNAV Form 5512/1
 - Credentials require a sponsor









Prohibited Items



Theses items and those similar in nature are **prohibited** inside NSWCCD Office Spaces

* Photography



Alcohol



Drugs



XXX

Sexually Explicit
Material



Weapons (Guns/Knives)

^{*}Permission Required



Cell Phones and PED Policy



Personally-owned cell phones are prohibited in:

- Restricted Areas
- Open Storage Areas
- Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF)
- Explosive operations buildings and storage areas

- CUI

- NAVSEA and Carderock PED Policies in place
 - NAVSEA Update, May 2016: "In such spaces [basic office spaces], sound judgment is required prior to conducting discussions. Although PEDs are authorized in these locations, each employee is responsible to ensure that controlled information is not inadvertently exposed to unauthorized personnel and recording of any kind is prohibited."






Industrial Security



Industrial Security



- A partnership between the federal gov't and industry in order to safeguard classified information
- Establishes standards for contracting companies who have access to classified information
- Prevents unauthorized disclosure of classified by:
 - -- Defining requirements
 - -- Identifying restrictions
 - -- Establishing safeguards





Contractors and Classified Info



- Prior to disclosing classified information:
 - ➤ Determine if contractor requires access in connection with a legitimate U. S. Government requirement
 - Contract Solicitation
 - Pre-contract Negotiation
 - Contractual Relationship
 - IR&D Effort
 - Determination based on:
 - Facility clearance valid for access at same or lower classification level as FCL
 - Storage capability



DD Form 254



DEPARTMENT OF DE	EEMe	_				RANCE AND SAFEG			
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 PUBLIC RELEASE. Any Information (classifi- by the industrial Security Manual or unless it has be submitted for approval prior to release 	been approved for public re			
to the Directorate for Freedom of Information and "In the case of non-DoD User Agencies, request	I Security Review, Office of	the Assistant Secretary of D	Defense (Public Affairs)" for revie	ew.
3. SECURITY GUIDANCE. The security classification of any other confidence and control of the classification	es a need for changes in the cation assigned to any infor- official identified below. Per ended. (Fill in as appropria	is guidance, the contractor mation or material furnisher ending final decision, the inter- te for the classified effort.	is authorized and encouraged to d or generated under this contrac formation involved shall be handl Attach, or forward under separate	provide recommended t; and to submit any ed and protected at the
ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENT: (if Yes, Mentify the pertinent contractual clauses is requirements. Provide a copy of the requirement.)	the contract document itse	if, or provide an appropriate	statement which identifies the a	odational Yes N
 INSPECTIONS. Elements of this contract are (If Yes, explain and identify specific areas or elen 				Yes N pace is needed.)
6. CERTIFICATION AND SIGNATURE. Secur Information to be released or generated u	rity requirements state	d herein are complete	and adequate for safeguare	ding the classified
a. TYPED NAME OF CERTIFYING OFFICIAL	b. TITLE	ore an quotion one		NE (include Area Code)
d. ADDRESS (include Zip Code)	I &	17. REQUIRED D	ron	NID KURCONTRACTOR
e. SIGNATURE		d U.S. ACTIV	ITY RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERSEAS NATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICER	
DD FORM 254 (BACK), DEC 1999		1		Reset





Other General Security Tasks

Other Key Processes



- Base Access for Visitors
- Hosting Foreign Visitors
- Foreign Travel Process

NSWCCD Visitors



- Major events (e.g., sub races, STEM competition)
 - Visitors are required to complete and sign the SECNAV Form
 5512/1
 - Form 5512/1 must be submitted five (5) days prior to visit
- Classified Meetings or other official visits
 - Carderock employee notifies Security Office of visitor
 - Initiate coordination at least 10 days prior to visit
- Upon arrival Visitor must provide name of POC

Hosting Foreign Visitors



Official Visits

- Must be processed/approved via Foreign Visit System (FVS)
- Security Division notifies Code sponsor and NCIS (Contact Officer)
- Three types: One time; Recurring; Extended
- Coordinate with NAVSEA HQ if DDL required
- If authorized, visitor can have accessed to classified information

Unofficial Visits

- Courtesy calls, general visits, public events, etc.
- Hosting code submits CARDEROCKDIV 5512/6
- Security Division will coordinate with host code and Visitor Center
- No access to classified information is authorized



Foreign Travel



All personnel traveling outside of U.S. on official duty or on leisure must:

- Submit a CARDERDIV Form 5540/1 at least 30 days prior to departure
- Submit a CARDERDIV Form 5540/2 within 3 business days of return to duty

Pre-travel guidance is provided in the Foreign Clearance Guide (https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil)

This process ensures the Foreign Travel Brief is given to personnel who require them. The briefs increase awareness regarding:

- Personal Safety
- Potential targeting
- Travel warnings and alerts
- Where to seek assistance





Check-In/Check-Out Procedures



ALL personnel MUST check-in and check-out with the Security Division (Code 105)

- Receive Security Briefings/Debriefings
- Turn in badges, credentials, CACs, ID Cards, etc.
- Receive/Return Courier Cards
- Update JPAS records
- Ensure ALL classified information assigned to you is transferred to the appropriate program/person before check-out
- Security (Code 105), Bldg. 42 should be the final stop, on the last duty day, before departing the installation.





Summary



Summary



Why are we here?



Ana Montes



Edward Snowden



Jerry Whitworth



Aldrich Ames



Robert Hanssen



Bradley Manning

The importance of security awareness and vigilance on the part of all employees cannot be overemphasized. It helps to detect internal and external threats and vulnerabilities ultimately assisting in preventing security breaches. It is only when all employees are vigilant and aware, that those who disregard security policies and procedures can be identified before causing irreparable damage to national security.

Security Is...



- » You
- » Me
- » Us
- » We


....a <u>Team</u> effort.

.....and Everyone's Responsibility



Questions







Captain Todd E. Hutchison

Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Larry Tarasek

Technical Director, NSWCCD



Content/Agenda



- Security Policy (the why)
- Description/Definition
- Types/Examples of CUI
- Safeguarding
- Destruction
- New CUI Implementation Policies

Guidance / Policy



- EO 13556, Controlled Unclassified Info
- 32 CFR Part 2002, Controlled Unclassified Info
- DoDM 5200.01, Vol. 4, INFOSEC Controlled Unclassified Info*

Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)



"Certain types of unclassified information requires the application of access and distribution controls, in addition to added protective measures. CUI is unclassified information that meets the standards for safeguarding and dissemination controls pursuant to law, regulations, and government-wide policies (e.g., E.O. 13556 and DoDM 5200.01-V4).

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Note: The originator of a document is responsible for determining, at origination, whether the information may qualify for CUI status, and if so, for applying the appropriate CUI markings.



Categories of CUI



Category	Description
Agriculture	Agricultural operation, farming or conservation practices, or the actual land.
Controlled Technical Information*	Information with military or space application that is subject to controls on the access, use, reproduction, modification, performance, display, release, disclosure, or dissemination.
Copyright	A form of protection provided by the laws of the United States (17 USC) to the authors of "original works of authorship."
Critical Infrastructure*	The most vital systems and assets (whether physical or virtual), who's incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the nation's security, economy, and/or public safety.
Emergency Management	Information concerning the continuity of executive branch operations during all-hazards emergencies or other situations that may disrupt normal operations.
Export Control*	Unclassified information concerning certain items, commodities, technology, software, or other information whose export could reasonably be expected to adversely affect the United States national security and nonproliferation objectives.
Financial*	Related to the duties, transactions, or otherwise falling under the purview of financial institutions or United States Government fiscal functions.
Foreign Government Information*	Information provided by, otherwise made available by, or produced in cooperation with, a foreign government or international organization.
Geodetic Product Information	Related to imagery, imagery intelligence, or geospatial information.
Immigration	Related to admission of non-US citizens into the United States and applications for temporary and permanent residency.



Categories of CUI (cont.)



Category	Description
Information Systems Vulnerability Information	Related to information that if not protected, could result in adverse effects to information systems.
Intelligence	Related to intelligence activities, sources, or methods.
Law Enforcement	Related to techniques and procedures for law enforcement operations, investigations, prosecutions, or enforcement actions.
Legal	Information related to proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial settings.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	Related to information generated by NATO member countries under the North Atlantic Treaty international agreement, signed on April 4, 1949.
Nuclear*	Related to protection of information concerning nuclear reactors, materials, or security.
Patent	Patent is a property right granted by the Government of the United States of America to an inventor "to exclude others profiting off of or benefiting from the patent owner's property."
Privacy	Personal information, or, in some cases, "personally identifiable information," as defined in OMB M-07-16, or "means of identification" as defined in 18 USC 1028(d)(7).
Proprietary Business Information*	Material and information relating to, or associated with, a company's products, business, or activities; data or statements; trade secrets; product R&D and performance specifications, etc.
SAFETY Act Information	The regulations implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002.



Examples of CUI



- For Official Use Only (FOUO)
- Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES)
- DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (DoD UCNI)* (also NNPI)
- Limited Distribution (LIMDIS) (NGA term)
- Distribution Controlled Data (Distro A,B,C,D,E,F)
- Privacy Information (Privacy Act of 1974)*
- Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
- Export controlled data*
- Sensitive But Unclassified (Dept. of State)
- DEA Sensitive



For Official Use Only (FOUO)



A DoD <u>dissemination control</u> applied when disclosure to the public of that particular information would reasonably be expected to cause a <u>foreseeable harm</u> to an interest protected by one or more of <u>FOIA Exemptions</u> 2 through 9.

FOIA Exemptions



Number	Description
Exemption 2	Information that pertains solely to the internal rules and practices of the agency that, if released, would allow circumvention of an agency rule, policy, or statute, thereby impeding the agency in the conduct of its mission.
Exemption 3	Information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding. The language of the statute must clearly state that the information will not be disclosed.
Exemption 4	Information such as trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a company on a privileged or confidential basis that, if released, would result in competitive harm to the company.
Exemption 5	Inter- or intra-agency memorandums or letters containing information considered privileged in civil litigation. (Examples: decision making processes and attorney-client privilege.)
Exemption 6	Information, the release of which would reasonably be expected to constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of individuals.
Exemption 7	Records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes that: (a) Could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings. (b) Would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication. (c) Could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others. (d) Disclose the identity of a confidential source. (e) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures. (f) Could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.
Exemption 8	Certain records of agencies responsible for supervision of financial institutions.
Exemption 9	Geological and geophysical information (including maps) concerning wells.



Marking FOUO



- Identify the originating agency or office
- Mark "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" at the bottom of the outside of the front cover (if there is one), the title page, the first page, and the outside of the back cover (if there is one).
- "UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY."
- Internal pages of documents that contain FOUO shall be marked "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" at the bottom.
- Subjects, titles, sections, paragraphs use the parenthetical notation "(FOUO)"
- Mark transmittal documents with FOUO attachments: "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ATTACHMENT."



Special Requirements



Exemption Notice for FOUO Disseminated Outside of the Department of Defense

This document contains information that may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

-- DoDM 5200.01-V4



Distribution Controls



"Statements intended to facilitate control, secondary distribution, and release of these documents without the need to repeatedly obtain approval or authorization from the controlling DoD office."

- For use on technical documents (not admin or general correspondence)
- Wording of the distribution statements may not be modified to specify additional distribution
- DoD Components generating or responsible for technical documents shall determine reason
- Documents containing export-controlled data shall be marked with applicable export-control statement



Distribution Statements



- Distribution Statements on Technical Documents All newly created, revised, or previously unmarked classified and unclassified DoD technical documents shall be assigned one of the following distribution statements:
 - A: Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited
 - B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't agencies only
 - C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't agencies & their contractors
 - D: Distribution authorized to DoD & U.S. DoD contractors only
 - E: Distribution authorized to DoD Components only
 - F: Further distribution as directed by the Controlling Authority
 - X: Use of Distro X is superseded [Convert to Distro C, w/ Export Control]

Distribution Control:

- Document authors/Controlling DoD Agency Reps are responsible for initial distribution control determinations
- Distribution statements shall remain in effect until changed or removed by the controlling office. Removal of or tampering with control markings by unauthorized personnel is strictly prohibited.



Distro Statement 'Reasons"



- Public Release
- Administrative or Operational Use
- Contractor Performance Evaluation
- Critical Technology
- Export Controlled
- Foreign Government Information
- Operations Security
- Premature Dissemination
- Proprietary Information
- Test and Evaluation
- Direct Military Support
- Software Documentation
- Specific Authority
- Vulnerability Information



Protecting CUI



- Encrypt all e-mails containing CUI
- Do not e-mail CUI to commercial accounts (Yahoo, Gmail, Hotmail, etc.)
- Do not post CUI on public websites/servers (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)
- Security clearance review prior to public release
- First Class Mail; Fax; Parcel Post
- Secure CUI documents when not in use (unlocked desks, cabinets, compartments)
- Use cover sheet




CUI Cover Sheets






NDW-DTRC 5570/1



DD Form 2923

Marking CUI E-mail







Destroying CUI



- By means approved for classified destruction
- *Any cross-cut shredder
- (NAVSEA implements an 'All Shred' Policy)


*NNPI must be destroyed as classified information



Need-to-Know



A determination made by a possessor of sensitive or classified information that a prospective recipient, has a requirement for access to, knowledge, or possession of the information in order to perform official tasks or services.



Our Adversaries Are Relentless





"U.S. Says Iran Hacked Navy Computers" – Wall Street Journal 2013



"Chinese Hackers Pursue Key Data on U.S. Workers" – New York Times 2014



"Data Breach at Anthem May Forecast a Trend" – New York Times 2015




"Hack of Adultery Site...Exposed Military Emails" – Military.com 2015




"Equifax's Hacking Nightmare Gets Even Worse for Victims" – Bloomberg 2017

Questions







Captain Todd E. Hutchison

Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Larry Tarasek

Technical Director, NSWCCD

Content



- Intro and Definition
- Your Responsibilities
- Categories
- Breaches and Reporting
- Policy Guidance and Resources

Personally Identifiable Information (PII) NAVSEA

"Information about an individual that <u>identifies</u>, links, relates, <u>or is unique to</u>, or describes him or her, e.g., a SSN; age; rank; grade; marital status; race; salary; home/office phone numbers; other demographic, biometric, personnel, medical and financial information."

What is PII?



Information about an individual that identifies, links, relates, or is unique to, or describes the individual which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity.

"High risk" (Sensitive) PII: may cause harm to an individual if lost/ compromised

- Financial information- bank account #, credit card #, bank routing #
- Medical Data- diagnoses, treatment, medical history
- Full or truncated Social Security number
- Place and date of birth
- Mother's maiden name
- Passport #

"Low risk" (Non-sensitive) PII: business related PII; releasable under FOIA or authorized use under DON policy

- Job title
- Pay grade
- Office phone number
- Office address
- Office email address *
- Full name
- DoD ID / EDIPI
- DoD Benefits number



^{*} Cautionary note: Growing problem with email phishing

Privacy Act of 1974



The Privacy Act governs the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable information about individuals that is maintained in systems of records by federal agencies.

A system of records (SOR) is a group of records under the control of an agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifier assigned to the individual, such as an SSN.

No agency shall disclose any record that is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains.



System of Records Notice (SORN)



- A notice of all systems of records under DoD control and retrievable by a personal identifier
- Must list authority for soliciting PA information
- Published by DoD in the Federal Registry
- Must include a 'Routine Use' Disclosure
- Can be deleted, altered or amended
- Must be reviewed annually
- Posted to Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties
 Division web site at http://dpcld.defense.gov/
 Privacy/SORNs/



Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)NAVSEA

PII is a sub-category of CUI

- Encrypt all e-mails containing CUI
- ■Do not e-mail CUI to personal e-mail accounts (Yahoo, Gmail, Hotmail, etc.)
- Do not post CUI on public websites/servers (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)
- Where applicable, use the appropriate cover sheet
- Apply need-to-know principle
- You must properly label and safeguard (not all inclusive):
 - For Official Use Only (FOUO)
 - Limited Distribution Technical Documents
 - Privacy Act Information
 - Personally Identifiable Information (PII)




Your Responsibilities




- Complete mandated PII training
- Safeguard/Protect
- Report violations and misuse

Your Responsibilities







PII Breach



<u>Breach:</u> Actual or possible loss of control, unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized access of personal information where persons other than authorized users gain access or potential access to such information for an other than authorized purposes where one or more individuals will be adversely affected.

Breach Prevention:

- Complete annual mandated PII training
- Follow Collections, Maintenance, and Use Policies
- Safeguard/Protect Information
 - Limit Access
 - Proper Transmittal (encrypt emails)
 - Use Coversheets
 - Proper Disposal
- Report violations and misuse to Privacy Coordinator



DD Form 2923

DON PII Breach Reporting Process





Command submits After Action Report to OCIO NLT 30 days after discovery

If written notification is required, Command must send letters to affected personnel within 10 days of breach report date

Within 48 hours, OCIO reports PII breach to DoD

Within 24 hours, OCIO determines level of risk and notifies Command if written notification is required

Within 1 hour, Command reports loss of PII to OCIO using OPNAV form 5211/13 and takes action to mitigate potential risk

Discovery of a loss or suspected loss/compromise of PII within the Command

OCIO will assign risk by assessing:

- Sensitivity of PII
- Extent of exposure to individuals without a need to know
- Means by which PII was lost, stolen or compromised
- Potential embarrassment that could be caused
- Context

(Risk is assessed as either 'High' or 'Low')



Primary Cause....



Human error causes of 80% of PII breaches

- -- Not knowing guidance
- Failure to follow established guidance
- -- Carelessness



The most commonly reported PII breach is the failure to encrypt emails.

The most commonly breached element of PII is SSNs.



Faxes and PII



- Faxing is one of the least secure means to transmit data
 - Uses non-secure phone lines
 - Easy to send to wrong person/wrong FAX number
 - Copy of transmission often left on machine
 - Recipient may not immediately pick up document, exposing PII to others without a need to know
- Alternative Methods to Faxing
 - Send encrypted/digitally signed email
 - Use Safe Access File Exchange (SAFE)
 - Use United States Postal Service

PII Guidance and Resources



- DoD 5400.11-R, DOD Privacy Program
- SECNAVINST 5211.5E, DON Privacy Program
- NAVSEAINST 5211.2A, NAVSEA Privacy Act PII Program
- CARDEROCKDIVINST 5211.1B, NSWCCD Privacy Program
- NAVADMIN 125/10, Safeguarding Personally Identifiable Information
- DON MSG DTG 081745Z NOV 12, DON Fax Policy
- Dept. of the Navy Chief Information Officer (CIO) website:
 http://www.doncio.navy.mil/Main.aspx

Helpful Links



- Encrypting Email Containing PII: http://www.doncio.navy.mil/ContentView.aspx?ID=3989
- Rules for Handling PII by DON Contractor Support Personnel: http://www.doncio.navy.mil/ContentView.aspx?ID=2145
- PII and Records Management:
 http://www.doncio.navy.mil/ContentView.aspx?ID=1415
- Safeguarding PII on the Command Shared Drive: http://www.doncio.navy.mil/contentview.aspx?id=755

PII Triangle



Need-to-Know

Does the person have a 'need-to-know'?

Do not forward to individuals who don't have a 'need-to-know'.

Non-Sensitive PII (No safeguarding required)

- Office phone #
- Work cell phone #
- Work address
- Federal employee salary info
- Office rosters including lists of employee codes

Is the email encrypted?

FOUO Statement in the subject line of the email?

Use a cover sheet (DD Form 2923)?

Safeguard

Division PII Coordinator

Adam Wallmark

<u>Adam.Wallmark@navy.mil</u>

301-227-2147

CARDEROCKDIVINST 5211.1B NAVSEAINST 5211.2B SECNAVINST 5211.5E

Sensitive PII (Safeguard)

- SSN
- DOB
- Place of Birth
- Medical Info
- Home Address
- Home Phone #
- Personal CellPhone #


Destruction

Cross-cut shred only – Never discard PII in a trash can, recycle bin, or dumpster.



Questions





Break 2



Break 2





Captain Todd E. Hutchison

Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Larry Tarasek

Technical Director, NSWCCD

Overview



- History
- Definition & Perspective
- Oversight Guidance
- OPSEC & Traditional Security
- Five-Step Process
- OPSEC In-Depth
- OPSEC and the Internet
- TRASHINT
- OPSEC and Public Release
- Miscellaneous







History and Origins of OPSEC



- Developed during the Vietnam War
- Study/analysis of how the enemy gained advance knowledge of combat air operations
- Established a methodology of looking at friendly ops from an adversary prospective
- The effort was code named Purple Dragon
- Conceived processes to negate/reduce friendly indicators observable by the enemy
- Methodology was termed 'Operations Security'
- National program formally established in 1988



The Purple Dragon

Presidential Authority



 National Security Decision Directive 298, "National Operations Security Program"

Each Executive Department and Agency assigned or supporting national security missions with classified or sensitive activities shall establish a formal OPSEC program ...

NSDD 298

National Operations Security Program

22 January 1988

-- signed by President Ronald Reagan



OPSEC Defined



A systematic and proven process by which the U.S. Government and its supporting contractors can deny to potential adversaries information about capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive Government activities.

- National Security Decision Directive 298



DoD Directive 5205.02E



- "Applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ U.S. Armed Forces during war, crisis, or peace."
- "Including activities involving research,
 development, test and evaluation; DoD
 contracting; treaty verification;
 nonproliferation protocols; international
 agreements; force protection; and the release
 of information to the public."



SECNAVINST 3070.2



- Establishes policy, procedures, and responsibilities for the Department of the Navy OPSEC program.
- The Secretariat, USN, and USMC shall maintain effective OPSEC programs that ensure coordination between public affairs, cybersecurity, security, operations, acquisition, intelligence, training, and command authorities and include mechanisms for enforcement, accountability, threat awareness, and oversight.
- OPSEC is to be incorporated into all operations and activities.



OPNAVINST 3432.1




- Directs Echelon II level commands (i.e., NAVSEA), possessing critical information, to establish formal OPSEC programs
- "Essential secrecy will be maintained by naval forces thru use of OPSEC measures...... OPSEC measures will be applied to research and system development, testing evaluation, and acquisition programs....."
- Echelon II level commanders can delegate, to subordinate elements (Carderock), OPSEC program establishment requirements



NAVSEAINST 3432.1A




- Directs establishment of OPSEC programs at designated NAVSEA field activities (i.e., Carderock).
 Delegates responsibility for NAVSEA OPSEC to the Director, Office of Security Programs and Planning
- Applies to all NAVSEA personnel (DoD civilians, military, and on-site contractors)
- "Establish and implement OPSEC policies, procedures, processes and guidance to enable the cost effective protection of NAVSEA critical information, people, technology, essential functions, and equipment."



CARDEROCKDIVINST 3070.1




- Directs division commander to establish a Carderock Division OPSEC program and designate a division OPSEC PM (delegated to Security Branch – 105)
- Applies to all departments and offices of Carderock Division
- Supplements OPSEC concepts, policies, and procedures of DON and NAVSEA



Relationship to Traditional Security



- Security programs protect **CLASSIFIED** information.
 - Personnel Security
 - INFOSEC
 - Industrial Security
 - Physical Security



OPSEC is a COUNTERMEASURES program.

OPSEC does not replace traditional security disciplines — it STRENGTHENS them.



OPSEC 5-Step Process



- Identify Critical Information
- Analyze the Threat
- Determine Vulnerabilities
- Risk Assessment
- Develop / Apply Countermeasures



OPSEC's most important characteristic is that it is a process that can be applied to any operation or activity.

What is Critical Information?



- Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities
- Probably unclassified, but still sensitive
- Two or three bits of critical information aggregated together may result in a sensitive disclosure



Data aggregation becomes the puzzle pieces revealing the 'big picture'

The information that is often used against us is not classified; it is information that is openly available to anyone who knows where to look and what to ask.



Critical Information



- Command Critical Information List (CIL) and Code specific CIL are posted on intranet
- CO's OPSEC Policy Memo stresses importance of protecting critical information
- Review CIL Cue Cards posted at all desks/workstations



Analyze the Threat



"The capability of an adversary coupled with the intention to undertake any actions detrimental to the success of program activities or operations."

- Nation states
- Insiders
- Criminal elements
- Terrorists
- Narcotics traffickers

Threat Actors	Motive	Targets	Means	Resources
Nation States During War Time	Political	Military, intelligence, infrastructure, espionage, reconnaissance, influence operations, world orders	Intelligence, military, broad private sector	Fully mobilized, multi- spectrum
Nation States During Peace Time	Political	Espionage, reconnaissance, influence operations, world orders	Intelligence, military, leverages criminal enterprises or black markets	High, multi-spectrum, variable skill sets below major cyber powers
Terrorists, Insurgents	Political	Infrastructure, extortion	Leverage black markets?	Limited, low expertise
Political Activists or Parties	Political	Political outcomes	Outsourcing?	Limited, low expertise
Black Markets For Cyber Crime	Financial	Hijacked resources, fraud, theft, IP theft, illicit content, scams, crime for hire	Tools, exploits, platforms, data, expertise, planning	Mobilizes cyber crime networks
Criminal Enterprises	Financial		Reconnaissance, planning, diverse expertise	Professional, low end multi-spectrum, leverage of black markets
Small Scale Criminals	Financial		Leverages black markets	Low, mostly reliant on black markets
Rogue Enterprises	Financial	IP theft, influence on sectoral issues	Outsourcing to criminal enterprises?	Sectorial expertise, funding, organization

Threat Actors and Capabilities

Threat = Capability + Intent




Vulnerabilities



'Weaknesses which are susceptible to exploitation by adversaries. A vulnerability exists when the adversary is capable of collecting an OPSEC indicator, correctly analyzing it, and then taking timely action.'

- Observation of friendly actions
- Open source research
- Poor security processes
- Lack of education and training
- Complacency / predictability



Vulnerability + Threat = Risk



Indicators



'Friendly actions and open sources of information that can be detected or interpreted by adversarial intelligence systems.'

- Signatures make indicators identifiable and stand out
- Associations relationships to other information or activities
- Profiles sum of multiple signatures (patterns)
- Contrasts established pattern vs. current observations
- Exposure duration and time an indicator can be observed

Allows the adversary to identify our critical information



Risk Assessment



- Risk management, not risk avoidance
- Threat + No Vulnerability = No Risk
- No Threat + Vulnerability = No Risk
- Threat + Vulnerability = Risk
- Justify the cost of losing information vs. the cost of implementing countermeasures

Risk is the likelihood of an undesirable event occurring and the consequences of that event.



Apply Countermeasures



- Prevent detection of critical information
- Provide an alternative association of critical information

- Deny the adversary's collection system
- Implement new, more stringent procedural actions

\$\$\$ - Cost is the biggest factor in implementing specific countermeasures



Basic Countermeasures



- All Paper, Notes, Printouts etc.— NAVSEA Shred Policy
- Sensitive/classified e-mails Encryption or use SIPRNET
- Phone Calls STE
- Sensitive/classified info documents SIPR/Secure Fax
- DO NOT "TALK AROUND" Sensitive Information on Non-Secure Voice Circuits
- No "Pillow Talk" (guard what's shared with significant others)
- No "Shop Talk" in restaurants, bars, public areas

The best countermeasure is to adhere to established security procedures



OPSEC and the Internet



- Recovered al Qaida training manual states:
 - "Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80% of information about the enemy"
- DoD Website Admin Policy review data for sensitivity before posting to publicly accessible websites (<u>www.defenselink.mil/webmasters</u>)
- OPSEC policy requirement to conduct periodic web site reviews/research for presence of sensitive information

Policy requirement for OPSEC PMs to conduct periodic web site reviews/research for presence of sensitive information



Social Networking Sites



- Current problem
- Adhere to SECDEF DoD policy
- Jun 2009 Deputy Director Memo
- Absolutely no expectation of privacy





 Pose a significant OPSEC, intelligence, and general security threat to DON personnel, facilities, and mission

DON employees are prohibited from posting information about DON personnel, missions, activities, and operations unless it is readily available to the general public AND has been authorized of public release IAW DoD guidance




OPSEC and Official IT Networks



- Technical nature of system passwords warrant added protections
- Don't share passwords with co-workers or unauthorized users
- Risks are information compromise/system degradation
- Sys Admins: Transmit router settings and passwords separately and always encrypt





CTF 1010 MSG, DTG 120537Z AUG 17, Subj: OPSEC Handling of Network Settings and Passwords



Our Adversaries Are Relentless





"Australian defense firm was hacked and F-35 data stolen, DoD confirms" – arstechnica.com, 2017



National Security

China hacked a Navy contractor and secured a trove of highly sensitive data on submarine warfare







TRASHINT



Dumpster-dives of random refuse collection points

Examples of Critical Information Found

Personally Identifiable Info (PII)

Official e-mails

Funding/resource/budget information

Office Memos

FOUO

Personal banking account numbers

Technical briefings





TRASHINT Countermeasures



- Periodically inspect outgoing trash and recycle containers
- Utilize approved shredders and burn bags
- Securely store sensitive information pending destruction

OPSEC and Public Release



- Official news articles
- Briefing presentations
- Training/informational brochures, pamphlets, etc.
- Manuscripts for books/movies/plays (fiction or non-fiction)
- Personal (unofficial) blogs
- SNS forums
- Ensure applicable time allowance (edits/conflicts)
- Restrictive/Limited Distribution Statements (A-F)

Pre-publication review is mandatory IAW DoDI 5230.29; DEPSECDEF & CJCS Jnt Msg DTG 090426Z AUG 06; DoDI 8550.01; and DoD 5205.02-M. Additionally, SF-312, Nondisclosure Agreement.



OPSEC: Capture The Flag

OPSEC: Capture The Flag

Your Responsibilities



- Ask Yourself ---
 - ✓ Is this information important to our adversaries?
 - ✓ Do I care if it is **published on the front page** of the Washington Post?
 - ✓ Will it help an adversary to assemble and form the overall picture?
 - ✓ Is this information central to the mission effectiveness of NSWCCD or my office?
 - ✓ What might this "insignificant" information reveal to adversaries about our intentions and capabilities?
- What will our adversaries learn by watching, listening, and collecting information we "protect?"



OPSEC Summary




- Identify critical information to determine if friendly actions can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
- Determine if information obtained by adversaries could be interpreted to be useful to them.
- Execute selected countermeasures that eliminate or reduce adversary exploitation of friendly critical information.

OPSEC helps identify the indicators that give away information about missions, activities and operations.

Still Important Today






World War II Era Poster



Still Important Today





Modern Era Poster



Contact Information




Cliff Young
Security Division (Code 105)
Building 42, Room 104
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Clifford.young@navy.mil

Remember...Think OPSEC!!

Security is Everyone's Responsibility – If You See Something, Say Something!







Captain Todd E. Hutchison

Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Larry Tarasek

Technical Director, NSWCCD

Training Objectives



- Detecting potential insider threats
- Adversary methodologies of recruitment
- Indicators of potential insider threats
- Reporting requirements



Insider Threat Program



DETECT -

Threats insiders may pose to DoD and U.S. Government installations, facilities, personnel, missions, or resources. This threat can include damage to the United States through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities.

Insider Threat Awareness



- It's not a career plan
- Various factors can contribute
- Identify and report
- Implement plans/procedures to mitigate risks



Definition



Insider Threat. A person with authorized access, who uses that access, wittingly or unwittingly, to harm national security interests or national security through unauthorized disclosure, data modification, terrorism, or kinetic actions resulting in loss or degradation of resources or capabilities.





Policy Guidance



- Presidential Memorandum of 21 Nov 2012, National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs
- EO 13587, Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information
- Committee on National Security Systems Directive (CNSSD) No. 504, Directive on Protecting National Security Systems from Insider Threat
- DoDD 5205.16, DoD Insider Threat Program
- DoD 5220.02-M, NISPOM Change 2
- SECNAVINST 5510.37, DON Insider Threat Program
- NAVSEAINST 5510.21, NAVSEA Insider Threat Program

Potential Motivators



- Feeling of injustice
- Loss of something valuable
- Disregard of a system of protections
- Need to feel important
- Just the thought that the rules don't apply
- Antithetical moral obsession

Any could transform an otherwise trustworthy employee into a disgruntled insider threat



Potential Risk Indicators (PRIs) NAVSEA WARFARE CENTERS Cardercock Division

- Ignorance (lacks awareness of policies/procedures)
- Complacency (lax approach to policies/procedures)
- Malice (malicious/intentional acts which create risks)

PRIs in Detail



Ignorance

- Unknowingly clicking on a phishing scam
- Attaching passwords to his/her laptop
- Leaving sensitive information on his/her desk unattended
- Discussing sensitive information in a public location
- Failing to adhere to obligations in understanding what is sensitive information and protecting it
- Unknowingly committing security infractions or violations
- Misusing Government IT systems for non-work functions

Complacency

- Using personal storage devices (e.g., phones, laptops, iPads) for conducting official business without authorization
- Uploading sensitive files to a third party site
- Allowing unknown individual inside the door behind him/her without a badge
- Unauthorized absences
- Unreported foreign contacts or travel
- Drug or unauthorized alcohol use in the workplace
- Possessing unauthorized weapon in the workplace

Malice

- Attempting to access information or physical spaces that are not relevant to work assignment
- Stealing sensitive information and sharing it with others or for his/her own gain
- Threatening violence against self or peers
- Expressing ill-will towards Component or other DoD organizations
- Criminal or illegal conduct, actions, or affiliations
- Brandishing a weapon in the workplace



Examples



- Espionage
- Unauthorized Disclosure
- Workplace Violence
- Sabotage
- Security Incidents/Violations
- Unwitting actions that increase vulnerabilities

Security Incidents



- Establishing pattern of security violations
- Seeking to expand access
- Being reluctant to submit to polygraph
- Being responsible for unaccounted for classified materials
- "Fishing" through offices/storage containers in search of classified material

Examples of PRIs related to security incidents



Mishandling of Classified



- Attempts to obscure classification markings
- Unauthorized removal of classification markings
- Classified materials kept at home
- Being responsible for unaccounted for classified materials
- Retention of classified obtained at previous jobs

Examples of PRIs related to mishandling classified materials



Misuse of Information Technology NAVSEA WARFARE CENTERS Carderock Division

- Accessing systems outside of normal work hours
- Repeated deviations from security procedures
- Use of unmarked media to store information
- Unexplained changes in systems/user activity
- Use of multiple passwords/log-ins
- Attempting to obtain/use co-worker passwords
- Accessing restricted files without authorization

Examples of PRIs related to IT systems



Suspicious Behavior



- Working hours inconsistent with job assignment
- Insisting on working in private without a valid reason
- Demonstrating exploitable behavior traits
- Revealing unexplained affluence
- Showing infatuation with covert activity and interest in clandestine operations

Examples of PRIs related to suspicious behavior



Unexplained Affluence



- Sudden purchase of high value items
- Unexplained ready cash
- Unexplained settlement of large outstanding debts
- Large deposits to savings accounts
- Opening of savings or stock accounts with foreign banks

Examples of PRIs related to unexplained affluence



Potential Workplace Violence



- Disgruntlement
- Substandard performance
- Frequent fights with coworkers and supervisors
- Failure to follow regulations and guidelines
- Displays of ill temper and false accusations against others
- Repeated reprimands, disciplinary sanctions

Examples of PRIs related to potential workplace violence



Potential Terrorism




- Associating with others in an affiliated group
- Changes in character, behavior, appearance
- Criminal activity
- Trouble with/keeping employment
- Unexplained affluence
- Strong ideological beliefs
- Long, unexplained absences from locality

Examples of PRIs related to potential terrorism



Affects of Life Events/Crisis





Opportunity and crisis can contribute to a vulnerability



Reporting



- Supervisors
- Security element
- Law Enforcement
- Military Department Cl Organization(e.g., NCIS)
- FBI



Failure to Report



- Military: Punitive action under Article 92 (UCMJ)
- Civilians: Appropriate disciplinary action under policies governing civilian employees
- Contractors: DoD 5220.22-M, NISPOM



Real Life Examples





Ben-ami Kadish

[US Army civilian employee]

Pled guilty to acting as

unregistered agent of
foreign power. (Dec 08)

[Israel]



Reality Winner
[NSA Translator]
Leaked information
about Russian hacks.
Plead guilty to
espionage, sentenced to
5 years (Jun 18)



Chi Mak
[DoD contractor]
Conspiracy and other violations. Sentenced to 24 years. (May 07)
[China]



Stewart Nozette
[Scientist]
Plead guilty to
espionage, sentenced
to 13 years. (Mar 12)
[FBI sting operation]



Wen Chyu Liu
[Research Scientist]
60 months prison, \$25k
fine and forfeiture of
\$600k. Trade secret
theft. (Jan 12)
[China]



Jin Hanjuan
[Software Engineer]
Sentenced to four years
in prison. Trade secret
theft. (Aug 12)
[China]




James Michael Wells
[USCG civilian employee]
Four consecutive life
sentences and restitution
of \$1.5 M. Workplace
violence. (Apr 12)



Bryan Martin
[USN enlisted sailor]
Pled guilty to 11
espionage charges.
Sentenced to 48 years.
(May 11)
[FBI sting operation]

Other, high profile cases







Bradley Manning – Unauthorized disclosure to WikiLeaks



Edward Snowden – Unauthorized disclosure of NSA surveillance programs





Aaron Alexis – Responsible for shooting at the Washington Navy Yard

Conclusion




Through implementation of a proactive and effective Insider Threat program, the Navy can minimize, or eventually, eliminate the unauthorized compromise or theft of National Security Information or head off the next destructive act that would target Navy personnel. A fully operational and effective Navy is critical to meet our National Security needs as we move into the future. Stopping the malicious insider, both witting and unwitting, will go a long way to ensuring the future effectiveness of the United States Navy.

Insider Threat should be every employee's concern!



Questions







DoD Level-1 Antiterrorism (AT) Training for New Hires

Ron Rucker

Captain Todd E. Hutchison

Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

1052 (Security Division)

Larry Tarasek

Technical Director, NSWCCD

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Introduction



- Threat is a real and present danger
- Remain vigilant while executing responsibilities
- International terrorist network may be present where you serve
- Personal safety is important
 - Remain alert
 - Be aware of your surroundings
 - Report suspicious activity
 - Pay attention to antiterrorism briefings
 - Make security part of your routine
- Do not be a tempting target!

America's effort to fight terrorism includes everyone.

Force Protection Conditions




 US military facilities use protective measures organized in a system called Force Protection Conditions, or FPCONs.

FPCONs are organized in five levels with increased

protection at each level:

- NORMAL
- ALPHA
- BRAVO
- CHARLIE
- DELTA.



As the threat of attack changes, Commanders change the FPCON to protect personnel

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FPCONs (cont.)




- NORMAL Routine security posture (access controls)
- ALPHA Increased threat (maintain indefinitely)
- BRAVO Increased/predictable threat (operational effects)
- CHARLIE Per intel, event likely (prolonged hardships)
- DELTA Actual/imminent event (not for extended duration)

Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAM)



- Supplement FPCONs
- Countermeasure to hostile force observation
- HHQ approval
- Provides change to security atmosphere



Random
Antiterrorism
Measure
(RAM)
In Progress







Anticipate



- Anticipating threats, risks, and vulnerabilities is fundamental to antiterrorism and personal security.
- Ways to do this include:
 - Research criminal activity
 - Understand the tactics & techniques
 - Know types of targets and locations
- Consider consulting these sources
 - Police crime reports
 - Other internet and media resources




Several sources allow you to research threats for yourself

Be Vigilant



- Vigilance is required to continuously observe your surroundings and recognize suspicious activities.
- Understand your environment's normal conditions.
- Knowledge of the normal amplifies abnormal activities.
 - Items that are out of place
 - Attempted surveillance
 - Circumstances that correspond to prior criminal activity in your area



Informed vigilance is fundamental to personal security

Don't Be a Target



- Blend in with your surroundings.
 - Do not wear clothing or carry items that attract criminal attention
 - Remain low key
 - Avoid high criminal locations



- Select places with security measures
- Be unpredictable
- Travel in a small group
- Use automobiles and residences with adequate security features



Report and Respond



- Report suspicious activities to appropriate authorities.
 - Report suspicious activity, do not try to deal with it yourself
 - In threatening situations, take steps to reduce your exposure
 - Follow the instructions of emergency personders



(The Fort Dix attack plot was thwarted by an alert store clerk)

Active Shooter Intro



- An Active Shooter incident can occur any time, any place
 - September 2013 shooting at the Navy Yard
 - March 2011 shooting of Air Force personnel at Frankfurt Airport in Germany
 - November 2009 shooting at the Soldier Readiness Center in Fort Hood, Texas
 - June 2009 shooting at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C.
 - May 2009 shooting of soldiers outside a military recruitment center in Arkansas
 - 2007 plot to attack Fort Dix using automatic weapons
- Active Shooter incidents are unlikely, but you should be prepared for the possibility.



An incident can occur anywhere, even on your own installation

Active Shooter Fundamentals



Responses to an Active Shooter include:

- Run
 - If you can escape the area, do so without hesitation
- Hide
 - If unable to escape, find a place to hide
- Fight
 - As a last resort, and only if your life is in immediate danger, alone, or as a group, attempt to incapacitate the shooter.



Responding to an Active Shooter



- Evacuate: If possible, be sure to:
 - If you can escape, do so without hesitation. Be aware that your evacuation point may be different than for fire evacuations.



- Evacuate whether others agree to or not.
- Leave your belongings behind.
- Help others escape, if possible. Assist individuals with special needs or disabilities.
- Attempt to rescue others or treat the injured only if you can do so without further endangering yourself or others.
- Keep your hands visible as you flee.
- Prevent others from entering the area, if possible.

1 8

Responding to an Active Shooter 2



- If unable to escape, find a place to hide.
- Your hiding place should:
 - Be out of the shooter's view.
 - Provide protection from shots fired
 (e.g., hide behind large items that afford protection).
 - Prevent shooter from entering (e.g., barricade the door with furniture).
- Silence cell phones/turn off any source of noise (e.g., radios).
- Remain quiet.
- Identify improvised weapons.
- Attempt to rescue others or treat injured only if you can do so without further endangering persons inside a secured area

1

Responding to an Active Shooter 3



- As a last resort, and only if your life is at immediate risk, together or alone, attempt to incapacitate the shooter.
 - Act as aggressively as possible against the shooter.
 - Throw items and improvised weapons.
 - Yell.
- Be committed to your actions until the eliminated.



Arrival of First Responders




- When first responders arrive, support their efforts and do not be a distraction:
 - Officers will move directly to where last shots were heard.
 - Remain as calm as possible and follow
 Officer's instructions. You may be searched.
 - Avoid quick movements, do not point.
 - Put down items in your hands; raise hands and keep hands visible at all times.
 - Officers may shout commands and push individuals to the ground for their safety.
 - Do not attempt to hold onto Officers for safety.
 - Do not stop to ask Officers for help proceed in the direction they have approached from.
 - Remember, LE's mission upon arrival is to stop the shooter, rendering aid is secondary.




Cooperate with first responders and don't be a distraction

Questions









Wrap up

(Questions)

complete evaluations





Surveys to Complete:

We Value Your Input! Kindly complete this short survey to let us know how we are doing (Takes less than 5 minutes): https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/2DayOnboarding

Carderock STEM Survey:

https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/G656YD6

Please use the link below to take a brief survey about your involvement in Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) activities prior to your employment at Carderock. STEM events, activities, and educational programs help prepare students for a successful career in STEM. Carderock participates in a wide variety of STEM programs to inspire, engage, educate, and attract the next generation of STEM professionals. The survey should only take 3 minutes of your time and your feedback will help develop return on investment metrics for command-sponsored STEM educational outreach efforts. If you are interested in learning more about Carderock STEM and Outreach, please contact Charlotte George at charlotte.george@navy.mil





All Presentations are available at the following address on your NMCI computer (CAC required):

https://wiki.navsea.navy.mil/display/WDP/Emplo yee+Onboarding+Program

